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WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE TRIANGLE OF STATE, LAW, 
AND RELIGION: A COMPARISON OF EGYPT AND INDIA 
Yüksel Sezgin∗ 
A personal status system can be defined as a system in which members of 
various ethno-religious communities, which are judicially recognized as such 
by central authorities, are subject to jurisdiction of communal (rather than 
national or territorial) norms regarding matters such as marriage, divorce, 
spousal maintenance, and inheritance.1 Such systems often feature not a 
national body of family law that is uniformly applied to all citizens, but instead 
a confessional system in which a Muslim is subject to Sharia, a Jew to 
Halakha, and so forth. 
In the past, colonial rulers employed personal status systems to 
compartmentalize subjects into ethno-religious and confessional groupings, 
and to distribute goods and services while denying certain populations the 
benefits of full membership in the political community.2 We can understand 
why colonial rulers, who often had a “divide and conquer” approach toward 
their subject populations, may have employed pluri-legal personal status 
systems. However, it is difficult to comprehend why such modern nation-states 
as Egypt and India—both constitutionally obliged to treat their citizens equally 
before the law3—would ignore their constitutional obligations and hold people 
to different legal standards on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and religion by 
continuing to employ old personal status systems. 
Many nations that originally inherited such pluri-legal systems from their 
colonial predecessors—such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Morocco—still 
continue to employ variant forms of personal status in their legal systems. 
Some scholars have considered the survival and persistence of pluri-legal 
 
 ∗ Visiting Professor of Women’s Studies, Religion, and Social Sciences, Harvard Divinity School; B.A., 
Mekteb-i Mülkiye; M.A., School of Oriental and African Studies; Ph.D., University of Washington. 
 1 Yüksel Sezgin, A Comparative Study of Personal Status Systems in Israel, Egypt and India 1 (Int’l 
Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 169, 1999), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/ 
169/135_sezgin.pdf [hereinafter Comparative Study]. 
 2 See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE 
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996). 
 3 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 
2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 40; INDIA CONST. arts. 14, 15. 
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personal status systems as an anachronistic legacy of colonialism.4 According 
to the proponents of the “colonial legacy” thesis, postcolonial governments, 
despite their strong desire to unify their field of personal status under an 
overarching network of law and courts, acquiesced to communal jurisdictions, 
which had originally enjoyed autonomy under colonial rule, because they 
failed to overcome the resistance of ethno-religious groups and authorities after 
independence.5 
However, “colonial legacy” accounts do not alone explain why personal 
status systems continue to exist today; these explanations often neglect the 
centrality of the state and the desire of its leaders to control and utilize personal 
status as a potent tool in the process of state- and nation-building. In fact, all 
postcolonial nations that inherited pluri-legal personal status systems upon 
independence faced more or less the same dilemma: what were they going to 
do with these fragmented systems, which were not necessarily conducive to 
building a modern bureaucratic machinery or a civic sense of national identity? 
Some countries opted for institutional unification (consolidating the courts of 
different groups under an overarching system of national courts); some for 
normative unification (abolishing different bodies of communal laws and 
enacting in their place uniform territorial laws); some for both; and some for 
neither.6 In the final analysis, however, countries’ choices were simultaneously 
determined by their ruling elites’ ideological orientations and ability to impose 
political will upon ethno-religious groups; and by the capacity of ethno-
religious groups to resist government interventions in personal status, 
preserving their juridico-political autonomy.7 
For example, Egypt inherited the Ottoman Millet system under which 
fifteen ethno-religious communities were granted autonomy to run their own 
courts and apply their own laws regarding their members’ matters of personal 
status.8 The Free Officers regime, which overtook the government in 1952,9 
viewed the Millet system as an undesirable legacy of “Ottoman imperialism” 
 
 4 See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 6 (1986). 
 5 Id. at 7–8; see also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS 454–79 (1975); Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 149, 153 (1989). 
 6 Yüksel Sezgin, Legal Unification and Nation Building in the Post-Colonial World: A Comparison of 
Israel and India, 8 J. COMP. ASIAN DEV. 273, 275–76 (2009). 
 7 Id. at 276. 
 8 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 8. 
 9 Paul S. Rowe, Neo-Millet Systems and Transnational Religious Movements: The Humayun Decrees 
and Church Construction in Egypt, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 329, 334 (2007). 
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and extra-territoriality, which they thought had to be eliminated to attain full 
sovereignty.10 Moreover, like the post-1966 military rulers of Nigeria, who 
abolished the customary courts and reorganized them under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Justice,11 the Free Officers were primarily concerned with the 
inefficiency, inconsistency, and prohibitive cost of religious jurisdictions and 
resolved to put an end to this “juridical anarchy” through institutional 
unification.12 As a result, in September 1955, the Nasserite regime enacted 
Law No. 462 abolishing all religious courts in the country, including Sharia 
courts, and unifying them under an overarching network of national courts.13 In 
the process, the government effectively co-opted and neutralized the 
opposition of ulama and clergy, who were directly affected by abolition of 
religious courts, and assured the long-term success of its reform.14 As a result, 
“secularly-trained” judges at civil courts, specialized family courts since 
October 2004, continue to apply different bodies of religious laws to 
individuals with different ethno-religious backgrounds.15 For example, when a 
Muslim Egyptian comes to the Family Court, the judge will decide the case 
according to Islamic law (statutory laws and Hanafi jurisprudence where the 
law is silent). Similarly, when a Coptic Orthodox Egyptian resorts to the court, 
the judge will apply the 1938 Coptic Orthodox Personal Status Ordinance, 
provided that the application of non-Muslim law will not violate Egyptian 
public policy essentially defined in reference to Sharia. 
India inherited a very similar personal status system upon independence. 
Thanks to British colonial rule, the country’s personal status system was 
already institutionally unified as of 1947; secular judges at civil courts applied 
different personal laws, such as Muslim, Hindu, and Christian laws.16 
However, post-1947 Indian leaders (most prominently Prime Minister Nehru 
and Law Minister Ambedkar) deemed the colonial practice of personal status 
as the main culprit that nurtured communalist sentiments and prevented the 
people of India from attaining a common sense of unity.17 Hence, they 
believed, if India had to be one composite nation under the law, that the 
 
 10 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
 11 E.I. Nwogugu, Abolition of Customary Courts—The Nigerian Experiment, 20 J. AFR. L. 1, 1–2 (1976); 
see also A.O. Obilade, Reform of Customary Court Systems in Nigeria Under the Military Government, 13 J. 
AFR. L. 28, 30–40 (1969). 
 12 Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 9. 
 13 Id. at 8. 
 14 Id. at 9. 
 15 See id. at 8. 
 16 Id. at 9. 
 17 See id. 
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archaic system of personal law had to be abolished and replaced with a secular 
uniform civil code (“UCC”) applicable to all citizens irrespective of caste or 
religion.18 Consequently, this desire of the founding elite was embodied in 
Article 44 of the 1950 Constitution.19 However, having failed to surmount the 
muscular opposition of religious minorities (especially the Muslim 
community), Indian leaders completely gave up on their dream of a UCC, 
instead implementing a limited version of the normative unification originally 
envisaged by the framers.20 They unified the law for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, 
and Jains through the 1955 and 1956 Hindu code bill reforms,21 reluctantly 
agreeing to the continuance of separate personal laws for Muslims, Christians, 
and Zoroastrian Parsis.22 As a result, Indian civil courts (and specialized family 
courts, where available) continue to apply different religious laws to people 
with different ethno-religious backgrounds.23 Currently Sikhs, Buddhists, and 
Jains are treated as “Hindus” for purposes of personal law—the only 
distinction from the pre-1947 period.24 Thus, when a person professing any of 
these religions comes to court, the judge will apply to his case the statutory 
Hindu law as codified by the parliament in 1955 and 1956, while applying to 
non-“Hindus” their own communal laws. 
Despite different regime and reform choices, Egypt and India share similar 
personal status systems. However, it would be incorrect to analyze Egyptian 
and Indian personal status systems solely from a state- or nation-building 
angle, and completely ignore the systems’ impact on fundamental rights and 
liberties of individuals, particularly women, who live under these systems. For 
a Coptic woman who needs to change her denomination to divorce her 
husband in Egypt, or for a Muslim woman in India ripped of her legal 
entitlements to maintenance by an unholy alliance between self-proclaimed 
leaders of her community and the Hindu government, personal status is not just 
an instrument of nation-building or judicial consolidation but a matter of rights 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 INDIA CONST. art. 44 (“The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code 
throughout the territory of India.”). 
 20 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 10. 
 21 The Hindu Marriage Act, No. 25 of 1955, INDIA CODE (1955), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1. 
asp?tfnm=195525; The Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956), http://indiacode.nic.in/ 
fullact1.asp?tfnm=195630; The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, No. 32 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1956), 
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195632; The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, No. 78 of 1956, 
INDIA CODE (1956), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195678. 
 22 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 10. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. 
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and liberties. With this in mind, this Essay addresses the following two 
questions: (1) how do Egyptian and Indian personal status systems affect the 
rights and freedoms of women who are subject to their purview?; and (2) what 
strategies and tactics do women use to claim rights and liberties that are 
unrecognized or encroached upon by the Egyptian and Indian personal status 
laws? 
The main premise of this Essay is that personal status laws, whether based 
on Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu tradition, are men-made (implying that no 
females were involved in this process), socio-political constructions that have 
come invariably to discriminate against women and deny them equal rights in 
familial relations. However, women do not silently acquiesce in violation of 
their rights and liberties by male-dominated religious norms and institutions. 
On the contrary, women-led hermeneutic communities all over the world are 
spearheading a silent but steady revolution that redefines women’s role as 
rights-bearing and equal individuals in familial and public space. In doing so, 
women’s groups contest the scriptural monopoly of state-sanctioned religious 
institutions, reinterpret religious laws, and reinvent the tradition by 
vernacularizing international human rights and womens’ discourses. Against 
this background, Part I of this Essay demonstrates the implications of personal 
status laws on the rights and freedoms of women by looking at the Egyptian 
and Indian personal status systems. Part II of this Essay traces women-led 
reform movements emerging in the last two decades in these two countries and 
demonstrates how Egyptian and Indian women have claimed the rights and 
freedoms that current systems have denied them by forming reinterpretive 
hermeneutic communities. 
I. HOW DO MUSLIM PERSONAL STATUS LAWS AFFECT WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
AND FREEDOMS? 
Whether done in the colonial or postcolonial era, restructuring personal 
status systems has always been a project dominated by men, both in the center 
and on the periphery. Women’s voices and inputs were rarely sought and 
almost never taken into consideration as men continuously negotiated among 
themselves rules pertaining to familial issues, such as marriage, divorce, and 
maintenance.25 Men “played god” by interpreting his commands in the holy 
 
 25 ASMA BARLAS, “BELIEVING WOMEN” IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
QUR’ĀN 94–95 (2002); JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY, AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 30–31 (2008); 
SEZGIN GALLEYSFINAL2 11/18/2011 10:01 AM 
1012 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 
scripture regarding what was required of a woman to release her from the bond 
of marriage, when a woman could be declared a disobedient wife and her 
husband could deny her maintenance, and how many days a woman must wait 
following her divorce before she makes herself available to another man. 
Personal status systems have always been manipulated to preserve traditional 
male privileges by institutionalizing discriminatory characteristics and gender-
unequal interpretations of major religious traditions. Thus, all personal status 
systems, whether based on Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu laws, constructed 
through androcentric readings of sacred texts and traditions, have come to 
discriminate heavily against women in familial matters such as marriage and 
divorce. 
However, one should not conclude that there is an inevitable and 
irreconcilable conflict between religion and women’s rights and liberties. The 
central premise of this Essay is that personal status laws are not inviolable or 
sacrosanct laws in their own right but socio-political constructions built 
through selective interpretations of sacred texts, narratives, and traditions. 
These laws were not carved in stone by God, but are laws made based on male 
interpretation of what God may have meant by a particular verse, word, or 
phrase in the holy scripture.26 By virtue of being men-made, religiously 
inspired laws are open to constant reinterpretation and amendment. As 
demonstrated below, some human rights and womens’ groups in Egypt and 
India constantly challenge the legitimacy of state-sanctioned personal status 
laws by offering enlightened, emancipatory, and women-friendly 
interpretations of classical texts, narratives, and customs—in some cases 
successfully reforming the system internally. 
Although nearly all personal status laws (e.g., Jewish, Hindu, and 
Christian) discriminate against women, this Essay focuses exclusively on 
Muslim personal status laws in Egypt and India as they are interpreted and 
applied by male-dominated secular and religious institutions. Most Muslims 
believe and many scholars of contemporary Islam now accept that when Islam 
was first revealed in the seventh century, it significantly advanced women’s 
status by granting them revolutionary rights and freedoms that had not 
previously existed in Arabian society.27 However, patriarchal interpretations of 
 
AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN’S PERSPECTIVE, at xi 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1992). 
 26 BARLAS, supra note 25, at 2. 
 27 See id. at 14. 
SEZGIN GALLEYSFINAL2 11/18/2011 10:01 AM 
2011] WOMEN’S RIGHTS 1013 
Muslim law and persistence of pre-Islamic tribal customs later caused this 
egalitarian tradition to become a patriarchal legal system that denied women 
equal rights in familial relations.28 Rules pertaining to divorce are especially 
demonstrative of women’s subordination under Muslim family laws.29 With 
this in mind, Part I.A addresses how Muslim personal status laws in Egypt and 
India affect women’s rights by focusing on intricacies of divorce and other 
aspects of breakdown of the family union such as postnuptial maintenance. 
Part I.B then explores specific strategies Muslim women have devised to 
empower themselves and respond to encroachments of their rights under the 
religious law. 
A. Egyptian Women and the Predicament of Divorce 
All Muslim citizens of Egypt are subject to mandatory jurisdiction of 
Sharia law for matters of personal status.30 Non-Muslims are subject to their 
own communal laws only if both spouses belong to the same sect (ta’ifa) and 
rite (milla); otherwise, Sharia law is applicable to them.31 Under Sharia law, a 
Muslim man has a right to a unilateral, no-fault, extra-judicial divorce 
(Talaq).32 A husband, who can have up to four wives,33 can divorce his wife 
anytime for any reason without a need to appear before a court, by 
pronouncing “Talaq” three times.34 
A Muslim woman, on the other hand, has truncated rights to “judicial” 
divorce (Faskh), through which she can ask the court to dissolve the marriage 
on grounds of harm or injury (darar).35 For example, if darar to the wife by 
the husband is satisfactorily established, under certain conditions, such as the 
 
 28 See id. at 203; WADUD, supra note 25, at 80–82. See generally FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE 
MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., Addison-
Wesley Publ’g Co. 1991) (1987). 
 29 See generally TUCKER, supra note 25, at 84–132. 
 30 See INCORPORATING SHARIA INTO LEGAL SYSTEMS, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7235357. 
stm (last updated Feb. 8, 2008, 7:36 PM). 
 31 Aznan Hasan, Granting Khul‘ for a Non-Muslim Couple in Egyptian Personal Status Law: Generosity 
or Laxity?, 18 ARAB L.Q. 81, 81 (2003) (citing Law No. 462 of 1955 (Dissolution of the Sharia and 
Confessional Courts and Transfer the Complaints that Would be Heard Before them to the National Courts), 
Al-Waqai al-Misriyah, 21 Sept. 2003 (Egypt)). 
 32 TUCKER, supra note 25, at 86. 
 33 ORZALA ASHRAF NEMAT, HEINRICH BÖLL FOUND., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY LAW IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ISLAM 12 (2006), available at http://www.boell-afghanistan.org/downloads/English_Family_ 
Law.pdf. 
 34 See Valerie M. Hudson & Patricia Leidl, The Arab Intifada and Women’s Rights, WORLD POL. REV. 
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7749/the-arab-intifada-and-womens-rights. 
 35 See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 92–95. 
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husband’s sexual incompetence or his prolonged absence or imprisonment, the 
judge may dissolve the marriage at the wife’s request.36 However, unlike 
Talaq, Faskh is a painful and costly process. It takes eight to ten years on 
average for a woman to obtain a judicial divorce.37 Egyptian women’s divorce 
predicament was somewhat eased with the enactment of Law No. 1 in 2000.38 
Under this law a woman can initiate a “no-fault” divorce (Khul) that does not 
require the husband’s consent, provided that she forgoes all financial claims 
upon him including maintenance (nafaqa) and the deferred dowry (mu’akhar 
saddaq) normally paid at divorce and provided that she returns the prompt 
dowry (Mahr al-muajjal) given to her at the time of the marriage (nikah).39 
Whether Law No. 1 has been able to fully remedy the Egyptian women’s 
predicament is discussed and answered at greater detail below. However, Law 
No. 1 has seemingly opened the door to no-fault divorce for an unlikely 
beneficiary: the Coptic Orthodox women who can now seek Khul divorce 
under Islamic law. 
Personal status matters of Copts are subject to the jurisdiction of civil 
courts, which apply the 1938 ordinance single-handedly promulgated by the 
liberal-minded laity without much input from the clergy.40 The ordinance, 
which had a very liberal attitude toward divorce, allowed divorce on nine 
different grounds41 including spousal incompatibility.42 However, the Coptic 
Church has repeatedly denounced the ordinance’s liberal attitude and failed to 
recognize divorce decrees granted by civil courts for any reason other than 
 
 36 See id. 
 37 See, e.g., Diane Singerman, Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming Islam, Legal Activism, and 
Coalition Politics, in REMAKING MUSLIM POLITICS: PLURALISM, CONTESTATION, DEMOCRATIZATION 161, 165 
(Robert W. Hefner ed., 2005). 
 38 Hasan, supra note 31, at 82. 
 39 See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 95–100; Hasan, supra note 31, at 82; Gabriel Sawma, The Khul’ 
Islamic Divorce in Egypt, MUSLIM CORNER (June 3, 2011), http://www.themuslimcorner.com/sunnah/the-
khul-islamic-divorce-in-egypt. 
 40 Ron Shaham, Communal Identity, Political Islam and Family Law: Copts and the Debate over the 
Grounds for Dissolution of Marriage in Twentieth-Century Egypt, 21 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 409, 
409 (2010). 
 41 These grounds for divorce include: (1) adultery; (2) one spouse’s conversion to another religion; (3) 
five-year absence with no news of the spouse’s whereabouts; (4) imprisonment for seven years or more; (5) 
mental illness lasting more than three years with no hope of cure, a contagious disease that threatens the 
partner’s health, or a husband’s sexual impotence over a period of three years; (6) domestic violence; (7) 
immoral or incorrigible behavior (e.g., homosexuality); (8) spousal incompatibility lasting over three years; 
and (9) joining a monastic order. Adel Guindy, Family Status Issues Among Egypt’s Copts: A Brief Overview, 
MIDDLE E. REV. INT’L AFF., Sept. 2007, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue3/jv11no3a1.html. 
 42 See Shaham, supra note 40, at 418 (noting that “a deep-rooted hostility between” spouses can be 
grounds for divorce). 
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adultery.43 The normative discrepancy between the church’s views and the 
views of the 1938 ordinance on divorce created a legal limbo for nearly 50,000 
Copts, whose marriages courts dissolved on grounds other than adultery.44 
These people are practically banned from remarriage because, in the eyes of 
the church, they are still married.45 To avoid the likelihood of such a marriage 
ban, couples seeking divorce must engage both ecclesiastical and civil 
authorities at once. This is a painstakingly long and complicated process. 
It is even more difficult and expensive for Coptic women, who must 
overcome judges’ unsympathetic minds and patriarchal attitudes. To ease their 
predicament, some Coptic women resort to a backdoor approach, Khul 
divorces, by exploiting the loophole that allows application of Sharia to non-
Muslims. For example, Hala Sidqi, a famous actress, divorced her husband in 
2002 through Khul.46 In order to obtain a Khul divorce under Sharia, she had to 
belong to a church other than her husband’s;47 she migrated to the Syriac 
Church (Syrian Orthodox), while her husband remained a Copt.48 By doing so, 
she was able not only to get a divorce under Sharia law, but also to obtain 
permission to remarry in her new church.49 The exact number of Coptic 
women who followed in Sidqi’s footsteps and applied for a Khul divorce 
remains unknown. But, as observers indicate, not many Christian women have 
been granted Khul, as Egyptian judges remain deeply divided over whether 
non-Muslims should be able to obtain Khul divorces by resorting to deceitful 
conversions.50 According to Mariz Tadros, a female Coptic Orthodox scholar, 
although it is debatable whether Khul is a feasible option for Coptic women, 
the very existence of this approach has unmistakably strengthened the 
bargaining position of Coptic women vis-à-vis their husbands and communal 
institutions, because they now may threaten to migrate to another church to get 
 
 43 See Amira Ibrahim, Hope on the Horizon?, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 11–17, 1999, http:// 
weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/420/fe1.htm (describing the Coptic Church’s efforts to restrict legal justifications 
for divorce to a more limited definition of adultery). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Egyptian Christian Actress Granted Divorce Under Islamic Law After 10-year Court Battle, 
ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN NEWS (Mar. 30, 2002), http://www.orthodoxnews.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
worldnews.one&content_id=11362&CFID=48154697&CFTOKEN=13787379&tp_preview=true. Both Sidqi 
and her husband were Orthodox Copts. Id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Gamel Nkrumah, Church Weddings, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 27–Apr. 2, 2008, http:// 
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/890/eg3.htm. 
 50 Interview with Mohamed Hamed El-Gamal, Former President, Maglis Al-Dawla [Council of State], in 
Cairo, Egypt (Apr. 14, 2004). 
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a divorce.51 If migrating to obtain Khul divorces does not work, Coptic women 
may always resort to a more drastic measure: conversion to Islam. The moment 
they convert to Islam, the marriage to a Christian husband is null and void 
(batil), as Sharia does not allow Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men. 
B. “Triple Talaq” and Maintenance in India 
Muslim personal law, heavily influenced by principles of English common 
law, local customs, and Islamic law and jurisprudence, governs family matters 
of Indian Muslims.52 As in Egypt, secularly trained judges at civil courts apply 
Muslim personal law in India.53 However, unlike in Egypt, an Indian judge 
who applies the Muslim law may be a non-Muslim, most likely a Hindu. 
Another important difference is that application of religious laws in India is not 
mandatory, but consensual.54 India, which claims to be a socialist, secular, and 
democratic republic,55 gives its citizens who do not want to be subject to 
religious laws an option to wed civilly and divorce under the Special Marriage 
Act (“SMA”)56 43 of 1954.57 In practice, however, the SMA remains 
ineffective legislation because most Indians are either unaware of it or are 
hesitant to use it due to socio-cultural dispositions and institutional 
limitations.58 
Like Egyptian Muslim women, Indian Muslim women suffer most from the 
husband’s right to unilateral extrajudicial divorce under the current system. In 
the Indian context, however, the specific problem is “triple Talaq,” or divorce 
by uttering “Talaq” thrice in a single sitting.59 Despite the urgency of the 
problem of triple Talaq, Muslim women’s groups in India have focused their 
attention on issues of spousal maintenance, especially since the Shah Bano 
 
 51 Interview with Mariz Tadros, University of Oxford, in Cairo, Egypt (Apr. 18, 2004). 
 52 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 9. 
 53 Id. 
 54 TAHIR MAHMOOD, INDIAN LAW INST., CIVIL MARRIAGE LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 11 
(1978). 
 55 INDIA CONST. pmbl., amended by The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
 56 The Special Marriage Act, No. 43 of 1954, INDIA CODE (1954), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp? 
tfnm=195443. 
 57 MAHMOOD, supra note 54, at 11–12. 
 58 Id. at 51–55; see also PERVEEZ MODY, THE INTIMATE STATE: LOVE-MARRIAGE AND THE LAW IN 
DELHI 129–34 (2008). 
 59 Karen Leslie Hernandez-Andrews, Talaq, Talaq, Talaq—Women Suffering in India Because of the 
Misuse of Triple Talaq (May 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wunrn.com/news/ 
2006/07_03_06/070906_india_triple.htm. 
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judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in 1985,60 and mostly shied away from 
dealing with issues of marriage and divorce. In minority settings, where issues 
of marriage and divorce are intricately entangled with identity politics as in 
India, women’s rights groups tend to deal with procedural and less 
controversial issues, such as maintenance, through legislative or judicial 
channels, while refraining from addressing substantive issues of marriage and 
divorce in majority institutions such as courts or legislative bodies. If 
controversial issues of marriages and divorce are ever addressed, they are 
usually addressed within the community through hermeneutic means, as 
demonstrated below. 
According to Sharia law in India, in the event of divorce, the husband must 
pay his wife the deferred part of her Mahr and provide her with maintenance 
(nafaqa) during the three-month waiting period following the divorce, which 
may last until the end of pregnancy if the wife is expecting (iddat). Otherwise, 
the husband has no further financial obligations toward his wife. Even though 
Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 requires all Indian 
husbands to continue providing for their divorcées who are destitute and 
unable to maintain themselves,61 Muslim men were excluded from the purview 
of Section 125 by virtue of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in 
Divorce) Act (“MWA”) of 1986.62 The MWA limited the Muslim husband’s 
postnuptial maintenance obligation to the iddat period.63 With the enactment of 
the MWA, the Indian government openly discriminated against Muslim 
women and denied them financial guarantees that it bestowed upon Hindu, 
Parsi, and Christian women. As shown below, despite their recent successes in 
the battle over maintenance, Indian Muslim women continue their struggle to 
end gender discrimination and injustices perpetrated by religious and secular 
laws and secure their right to “a reasonable and fair provision,” which is 
increasingly under attack by communal forces. 
 
 60 Khan v. Begum (Shah Bano), (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/823221. See 
generally Nawaz B. Mody, The Press in India: The Shah Bano Judgment and Its Aftermath, 27 ASIAN SURV. 
935 (1987). 
 61 The Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 2 of 1974, § 125, CODE CRIM. PROC. (1974), http:// 
indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=197402. 
 62 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986, § 5, INDIA CODE (1986), 
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625. 
 63 See id. § 4. 
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II. HOW DO WOMEN CLAIM THE RIGHTS DENIED THEM BY PERSONAL STATUS 
LAWS? 
Muslim personal status laws in both Egypt and India are detrimental to the 
rights and freedoms of women. This is because neither government has proved 
able or willing to reform their personal status systems, and both failed to 
protect women against encroachments of religious norms and authorities. 
Nevertheless, neither Egyptian nor Indian Muslim women silently accept 
violation of their fundamental rights under state-sanctified personal status 
laws. These women are fighting back fiercely to advance their rights and 
freedoms. In doing so, they challenge the hegemonic narratives of gender and 
subjectivity and redefine their roles as rights-bearing individuals and equal 
citizens in the familial and public space. 
In these religious systems, where women are systematically denied their 
fundamental rights in the name of obeying God’s orders, the discussion 
revolves around the question of whose interpretation of the Holy Quran or 
Hadith is authoritative. Hence, it is not surprising to see that in both countries 
women increasingly respond to violations of their rights by forming 
hermeneutic communities that challenge official interpretations of religious 
precepts and offer alternative women-friendly readings of law hoping to 
advance their rights and reform the system internally. In the process, to 
identify and remove disabilities and women’s rights violations, hermeneutic 
communities engage in an An-Na’imian “internal discourse” through 
enlightened interpretations of cultural values and norms.64 However, 
hermeneutic groups are not only agents who solely engage in internal scriptural 
activity, but also interlocutors who participate in cross-cultural dialogues on a 
global level from which they draw intellectual inspiration, resources, and 
moral authority. These dialogues guide the hermeneutic groups in locating and 
retrospectively constructing cultural references and narratives that promote a 
particular vision and set of rights. This is the very process that Peggy Levitt 
and Sally Engle Merry refer to as “vernacularization” through which 
hermeneutic communities translate global women’s rights discourses and 
 
 64 See generally, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining 
International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 19, 19–43 
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im ed., 1991). 
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practices by meticulously grafting them onto culture, tradition, religious 
beliefs, and teachings of their own societies.65 
Hermeneutic communities usually adopt moderate means and strive for 
incremental change by working within current institutions. They may build 
cross-communal alliances, lobby for judicial and legislative change, mobilize 
courts, educate the public, and seek behavioral change by framing gender 
issues in terms that resonate with the dominant religio-legal culture.66 
However, as governments and religious authorities repeatedly fail to respond to 
calls for reform, some disillusioned groups may completely cease to use state-
run personal status institutions and steadily evolve into “self-ruling” 
communities by setting up their own judicial bodies that apply their own 
version of law to members of their self-proclaimed communities. The All India 
Muslim Women Personal Law Board (“AIMWPLB”), after long years of 
dissatisfaction with the version of Sharia promoted by the male-dominated All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board (“AIMPLB”) and secular state courts, set 
up a women’s Sharia court (mahila adalat) in Lucknow to offer religiously 
acceptable solutions to problems like triple Talaq, implementing an 
enlightened and egalitarian interpretation of Islamic law. Against this 
backdrop, this Part looks at activities of hermeneutic and rule-making 
communities in Egypt and India and illustrates strategies and tactics 
successfully employed by these groups to advance women’s rights under 
Muslim personal status laws. 
A. Khul Law: Egyptian Muslim Women Redefining Sharia 
Hermeneutic communities have been particularly active in Egypt, where 
top-down approaches to reform have failed and the women’s rights regressed, 
especially since a 1985 decision of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court 
striking down Law No. 44 of 1979 as unconstitutional.67 Law No. 44 stipulated 
that taking a second wife without the consent of the first wife constituted an 
darar to the first wife and therefore entitled her to seek divorce from the 
 
 65 See generally Peggy Levitt & Sally Engle Merry, Unpacking the Vernacularization Process: The 
Transnational Circulation of Women’s Human Rights (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 66 See id. (manuscript at 3–4). 
 67 Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12. 
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court.68 This law was unconstitutionally promulgated by a presidential decree, 
but was a quantum leap in women’s right to divorce.69 It did not take long for 
opponents of the law, who viewed it in violation of Sharia for curbing Muslim 
men’s “god-given” right to polygyny, to launch a judicial onslaught to stop its 
implementation. In May 1985, their efforts finally came to fruition when the 
court declared Law No. 44 unconstitutional on technical grounds.70 Two 
months later, the parliament hastily put together a revised law (Law No. 100) 
to replace and eliminate the controversial provision of Law No. 44 that 
“considered a second marriage by the husband as ipso facto a cause of harm to 
the first wife” and grounds for divorce.71 
The failure of the 1979 law taught invaluable lessons to Egyptian women’s 
rights groups that wanted to reform the personal status laws. First, the reform 
had to be initiated by the women themselves through a combination of 
grassroots mobilization and government support, rather than for the women 
through unpopular top-down processes.72 Second, any change in the law had to 
be firmly rooted in historical sources and Sharia traditions.73 As evidenced by 
Law No. 44, a solely liberal or secular approach would backfire and do more 
harm than good to the Egyptian womens’ cause. As one prominent feminist put 
it, Egyptian women’s groups throughout the 1990s adopted the “strategy of 
engaging religious discourse, based on the women’s reading of their rights 
under the principles of Sharia.”74 Hence, the setback experienced in 1985 led 
various women’s groups to act collectively and campaign for equal rights for 
women in personal status by utilizing an Islamic framework. 
During the next two decades, women’s groups devoted their energy 
primarily to the Khul law. As noted above, the new law allowed a woman to 
initiate a no-fault divorce without the consent of her husband, provided she 
renounced her pecuniary claims against him and returned the prompt dowry 
 
 68 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron with Baudouin Dupret, Breaking up the Family: Divorce in Egyptian Law 
and Practice, 6 HAWWA: J. WOMEN MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC WORLD 52, 56 (2008) [hereinafter Breaking up the 
Family]. 
 69 See id. at 56–57; Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12. The “decree-law procedure,” used to pass 
Law No. 44, was improperly used because this was not an “urgent matter.” Breaking up the Family, supra note 
68, at 57. 
 70 Breaking up the Family, supra note 68, at 56–57; Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12. 
 71 Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt’s Laws of Personal Status, 10 ARAB STUD. Q. 319, 341 (1988). 
 72 See Comparative Study, supra note 1, at 12. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Singerman, supra note 37, at 161 (quoting Mona Zulficar, The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt 
(Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
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she received at the time of nikah.75 Throughout the process that culminated in 
the enactment of Law No. 1, women’s groups worked directly with 
government officials, lobbied members of parliament, and consulted with 
members of ulama at al-Azhar. As Professor Zeinab Redwan, a female 
member of the Egyptian Parliament and one of the architects of the reform 
noted, “[during the entire process] women repeatedly resorted to the Islamic 
rhetoric and built their case around a hadith that reported Prophet Muhammad 
allowing a woman to divorce her husband by returning the orchard that she had 
received as dowry.”76 
Critics argued that the Sharia had required the consent of the husband to 
divorce even in the case of Khul. Opponents also added that the law was only 
meant for rich women, as the poor could not afford to forgo their rights to 
maintenance and deferred dowry, nor could they pay back the prompt dowry.77 
However, recent evidence shows that an increasing number of middle and 
lower class women are taking advantage of Khul, because its actual cost has 
not been as high as was claimed by the critics of Law No. 1.78 With this in 
mind, most problems that women encounter are social and institutional in 
nature. Public opinion surveys point out that most Egyptians consider Khul as 
an option to be taken only by Westernized women.79 In popular culture, such 
as movies and cartoons, the women who resort to Khul are often depicted as 
immoral persons in Westernized garments who divorce their husbands for 
frivolous reasons just to run to the arms of their secret lovers.80 In the early 
years of the reform, these negative images were also widespread among 
personal status court judges.81 In fact, some attribute the discrepancy82 between 
 
 75 See supra Part I.A. 
 76 Interview with Zeinab Radwan, Member, Shariah Council, Dean, Cairo University’s Dar Al-Ulum, in 
Cairo, Egypt (May 14, 2004). 
 77 Hala Sakr & Mohamed Hakim, One Law for All, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 1–7, 2001, http:// 
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/523/sc1k.htm. 
 78 Nadia Sonneveld, Reinterpretation of Khul‘ in Egypt: Intellectual Disputes, the Practice of the Courts, 
and Everyday Life (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Leiden University) (on file with author). 
 79 See Fayza Hassan, The Meaning of Emancipation, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Mar. 1–7, 2001, http:// 
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/523/sc1.htm; Nadia Sonneveld, If Only There Was Khul‘ . . ., 17 ISIM REV. 50, 50–
51 (2006). 
 80 See generally, e.g., Sonneveld, supra note 79. 
 81 Singerman, supra note 37, at 181–82. 
 82 For example, in the Cairo Governorate, only 4.5% of the khul‘ applications filed between March 2000 
and March 2001 were actually ruled on by the personal status courts. Azza Soliman & Azza Salah, The Legal 
Aspects of Khol‘ and Its Application, in THE HARVEST: TWO YEARS AFTER KHOL‘ 19–20 (Seham Abd el 
Salam trans., 2003), available at http://www.cewla.org/admin/issues/download/14.rar?PHPSESSID=51b2a8d9 
a12115a33ff3f4ee7390cc72. For the same period, in the Giza Governorate, the rate was 6.9%. Id. at 21–22. 
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the number of Khul petitions filed and the actual number of divorces granted 
by the courts to the unwillingness and obstructive practices of the judges and 
other court officials.83 During the first three years of the law, out of nearly 
210,000 divorces granted by the Egyptian judges, only about 5,000 were Khul 
divorces.84 
B. Impact Litigation and the Rise of Islamic Feminism in India 
Indian women’s organizations, including mainstream Muslim women’s 
groups, have historically adopted a secularist approach toward the issue of 
reform in personal law: 
Towards Equality, the report of the National Committee on the Status 
of Women, said: 
The absence of a UCC in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century . . . is an incongruity that cannot be justified with all 
the emphasis that is placed on secularism, science and 
modernism. The continuance of various personal laws which 
accept discrimination between men and women violates the 
fundamental rights.85 
Since the 1950s, Indian feminists generally have believed that social uplifting 
of women could only be achieved through replacement of religious laws with a 
secular UCC. However, ideological transformations since the mid-1980s, the 
rise of communal violence, and the appropriation of the concept of the UCC by 
right-wing Hindu platforms (e.g., Sangh Parivar and Bharatiya Janata Party) 
have forced the women’s organizations to reconsider their strategies and drop 
their earlier calls for a UCC.86 In this new environment, a UCC has ceased to 
symbolize the advancement of women’s rights and become a weapon in the 
hands of racist and sexist groups. As Syeda Hamid, the President of the 
 
 83 Mulki Al-Sharmani, Egyptian Family Courts: A Pathway of Women’s Empowerment?, 7 HAWWA: J. 
WOMEN MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC WORLD 89, 101–03 (2009). 
 84 See Divorce Statistics, CENT. AGENCY FOR PUB. MOBILIZATION & STAT., http://msrintranet.capmas. 
gov.eg/pls/census/spart_all_e?lname=FREE&lang=0 (last visited Aug. 19, 2011). The statistics agency does 
not provide any information on the number of Khul divorces awarded by the courts. Unfortunately, nearly all 
information provided on the number of Khul divorces relies upon anecdotal evidence offered by judges, 
lawyers, and activists. 
 85 Nivedita Menon, Women and Citizenship, in WAGES OF FREEDOM: FIFTY YEARS OF THE INDIAN 
NATION-STATE 241, 244 (Partha Chatterjee ed., 1998) (quoting MINISTRY OF EDUC. & SOC. WELFARE, INDIA 
DEP’T OF SOC. WELFARE, TOWARDS EQUALITY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN 
INDIA 142 (1974)). 
 86 Flavia Agnes, Constitutional Challenges, Communal Hues and Reforms Within Personal Laws, 
COMBAT L. (Mumbai), Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 4, 5–6. 
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Muslim Women’s Forum, put it, this has posed difficult ideological and ethical 
dilemmas particularly to Muslim feminists: 
The bottom line is that there should be a uniform law for all  
citizens. . . . But of course we changed our attitude and  
policy. . . . We had to. . . . When the community is battered you keep 
your silence. How you can talk about reform when you are being 
killed. . . ? How you can use the same language [UCC] with the 
people who are battering you [right-wing Hindus]. . . ? You know 
what happened in Ayodhya, you know about the pogroms and 
genocide of Gujarat. . . . When the state becomes a predator . . . you 
keep your silence, you do not talk about reforming the Islamic law, 
because everything is about identity and everything is about  
religion. . . .87 
As a result, since the 1990s Muslim women’s groups have instead relied 
upon a mixture of legislative and judicial strategies and, whenever possible, 
engaged in hermeneutic activities to change Muslim laws internally. For 
instance, in the last two decades, Muslim women’s rights activists have put 
forth quintessential examples of ways to mobilize courts to challenge and 
reform gender-unequal personal status laws. In the aftermath of the infamous 
MWA of 1986,88 women’s rights activists launched a campaign to defeat the 
ill-famed legislation’s minimalist interpretations, which denied Muslim 
women’s right to maintenance beyond the iddat period by invoking an 
innocuous clause that escaped the attention of conservative groups:89 “[A] 
divorced woman shall be entitled to- (a) a reasonable and fair provision and 
maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period.”90 Their 
campaign culminated with the Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in Danial 
Latifi,91 in which the court overruled the minimalist interpretations of the 
MWA, and held that the Muslim husband was required to make a lump-sum 
payment to his ex-wife during the period of iddat, including not only the 
nafaqa and deferred part of her Mahr, but also a “reasonable and fair 
provision” that would financially secure her future well beyond iddat.92 Thanks 
 
 87 Interview with Syeda Hamid, Founder & President, Muslim Women’s Forum, in New Delhi, India 
(Mar. 19, 2005). 
 88 See supra Part I.B. 
 89 Agnes, supra note 86, at 8.
 
 90 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986, § 3(1)(a), INDIA CODE 
(1986) (emphasis added), http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625. 
 91 Latifi v. Union of India (Daniel Latifi), (2001) 7 S.C.C. 740 (India), http://indiankanoon.org/doc/ 
410660/. 
 92 Id. 
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to the expansionist interpretation adopted by the court, Muslim women who 
resort to state courts now receive some of the highest maintenance awards in 
the country.93 
In post-Shah Bano India where communal tensions rose and the threat of 
Hindutva groups escalated, the Muslim community has grown increasingly 
insular and resistant to change in its laws. The community fell under the 
control of conservative elements such as the AIMPLB. The board has set up its 
own network of Sharia courts (Dar-ul Qazas) on the premise that non-Muslims 
are not qualified to administer Sharia.94 This view has increasingly gained 
currency in the Muslim community since the Shah Bano case in which the all-
Hindu bench of the Indian Supreme Court practically engaged in independent 
thought (ijtihad) and told Muslims how to read and interpret the Quran 
correctly!95 The AIMPLB was the main architect of the MWA of 1986, which 
limited women’s right to maintenance to only iddat. However, after it failed to 
influence the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the act in Danial Latifi, 
the AIMPLB and its courts applying a male-centric version of Sharia have 
sought to discourage women in the community from taking their cases to state 
courts and claiming maintenance beyond the iddat. For example, the qazi of 
the Delhi Sharia Court, argues: 
It is the obligation of a Muslim to live according to rules of shariat. 
When there is a shariat court, if one goes to civil courts and wins a 
case according to rules applied by non-Muslims it will be haram or a 
sin in the eyes of Allah. . . . Muslims have to come to shariat courts; 
even if they lose, they will still be winners in the eyes of Allah.96 
Against this background, where communal forces prevented women from 
enjoying the rights and liberties promised to them under the secular law, there 
was only one option left for groups who demanded change in Muslim personal 
laws: internal reform through hermeneutic means. In fact, like their Egyptian 
counterparts, some Indian Muslim women’s groups have increasingly resorted 
 
 93 See generally Werner Menski, Double Benefits and Muslim Women’s Postnuptial Rights, KERALA L. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at 21. 
 94 Interview with Qasim Rasool Ilyas, All India Muslim Pers. Law Bd., in New Delhi, India (Mar. 8, 
2005). 
 95 Subrata K. Mitra & Alexander Fischer, Sacred Laws and the Secular State: An Analytical Narrative of 
the Controversy over Personal Laws in India, INDIA REV., July 2002, at 99, 119. 
 96 Interview with Mohammad Kamil Qasmi, Qazi, Delhi Shariat Court, All India Muslim Pers. Law Bd., 
in New Delhi, India (Mar. 8, 2005). 
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to reinterpretative strategies to challenge the textual authority of the AIMPLB 
and state courts and pushed to advance their rights under Sharia law.97 
Realizing the increasing control of the AIMPLB over personal status law 
and institutions, many Muslim women activists joined the board and its 
decision-making bodies to draw attention to and resolve women’s issues under 
the Muslim personal law. For example, to put an end to the predicament of 
triple Talaq, some female members prepared a model marriage contract 
(nikahnama), which allowed women to stipulate conditions in the contract such 
as an option for delegated divorce (Talaq-e tawfiz), through which the husband 
permits his wife to initiate divorce at her own will, and presented it to the 
board for approval. However, the male-dominated board rejected it on the 
claim that it was an “un-Islamic” proposal and swiftly silenced uncompliant 
women’s voices throughout the organization.98 In response, in 2005, some 
female members of the board split and organized in Lucknow the AIMWPLB, 
representing the major sects and schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The 
AIMWPLB released a new nikahnama in 2008 that consisted of seventeen-
point guidelines for marriage for bride and groom under the Islamic law 
(hidayatnama) and an eight-point section on divorce process. It prohibits triple 
Talaq through text messaging, email, video-conferencing, or phone, and 
recognizes women’s right to delegated divorce (Talaq-e tawfiz) and Khul. The 
model nikahnama also details women’s right to postmarital maintenance and 
Mahr. To preempt the possible attacks of the traditional ulama on the new 
nikahnama, the new marriage contract carries extensive quotes from relevant 
verses of the Quran. As Shaista Amber, president of the AIMWPLB, reports, 
the new nikahnama steadily gains acceptance in the community and about fifty 
couples have married under the relatively gender-balanced contract.99  
In addition, AIMWPLB has established its own court structure (mahila 
adalat), deciding cases according to a women-friendly interpretation of Sharia. 
The women’s court is located in Lucknow and convenes every Friday at a local 
mosque built by Ms. Amber. It currently decides about 200 divorce cases per 
year. Both male and female judges (qazis) sit together at mahila adalat. The 
law applied is not substantively different from the Sharia law applied by 
AIMPLB courts, but qazis at the mahila adalat implement it with an eye to 
 
 97 See generally Sylvia Vatuk, Islamic Feminism in India: Indian Muslim Women Activists and the 
Reform of Muslim Personal Law, 42 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 489 (2008). 
 98 Noorjehan Safia Niaz, Marriage in Islam, COMBAT L. (Mumbai), Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 25, 28. 
 99 Telephone Interview with Shaista Amber, President, All India Muslim Women Pers. Law Bd. (May 
12, 2010). 
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“universal standards of human and women’s rights.”100 The Bharatiya Muslim 
Mahila Andolan (“BMMA”), another organization working to secure the rights 
of women through feminist and humanist interpretations of Islam, has taken 
the women’s cause one step further and made history by allowing a female 
qazi, Syeda Hamid, to solemnize a nikah ceremony where all four witnesses 
were also women.101 While the members of the mainstream ulama questioned 
whether a woman could solemnize marriage under the Islamic law, BMMA 
silently broke the tradition and opened a new page for Muslim women in India 
who could rely on neither the secular state nor male-dominated communal 
institutions but their own initiative to end the discrimination they suffer under 
Indian personal laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Egypt is a Muslim-majority, authoritarian state where Sharia is the 
principal source of legislation. India is a Hindu-majority state with a socialist, 
secular, and democratic regime. Despite differences in political orientation, for 
various reasons explained above, both nations have similar personal status 
systems, under which secularly trained judges at civil courts apply different 
religious laws in regard to matters of family law. 
Experiences of Indian and Egyptian Muslim women under the personal 
status systems of the two countries seem to be strikingly similar as well. The 
main problems that women suffer from under both systems are related to 
gender-unequal divorce laws and postnuptial maintenance. Solutions offered 
by political and judicial authorities to these problems in both countries are also 
very similar. In Egypt, to ease Muslim women’s predicament of divorce, 
President Sadat promulgated Law No. 44 in 1979 through unpopular top-down 
means. The result was a conservative backlash. The Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court struck down Law No. 44 of 1979 as unconstitutional in 
1985. Law No. 100, which replaced Law No. 44, reverted women rights to 
divorce back to their pre-1979 state. In India, an all-Hindu bench of the India 
Supreme Court tried to unilaterally expand Muslim women’s right to 
maintenance by practically engaging in ijtihad and imposing its own 
interpretation of Sharia upon the Muslim community. The result was another 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Law Commission Member Hails Syeda Acting ‘Kazi’ to Solemnize ‘Nikah,’ ONEINDIA NEWS (Aug. 14, 
2008), http://news.oneindia.in/2008/08/14/law-commission-member-hails-syeda-acting-kazi-to-solemnise-
nikah-1218717283.html. 
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conservative backlash. The Indian parliament enacted the MWA of 1986 to 
reverse the court’s judgment and limit Muslim women’s right to maintenance 
to iddat alone. 
In response, Egyptian Muslim women resorted to hermeneutic means to 
render women-friendly interpretations of Sharia and finally succeeded in 
convincing the political authorities to enact Law No. 1 of 2000 that recognized 
women’s right to Khul. This was the greatest achievement of the women’s 
movement in modern Egyptian history. However, prevailing socio-cultural 
dispositions and obstructive practices of some judges,102 who even called 
women who made use of their “prophet-given” right to Khul whores 
(sharmoota), derailed the application of the law and eclipsed its success. 
Indian Muslim women’s rights activists mobilized the courts and turned the 
ill-intended MWA into favorable legislation by defeating its minimalist 
interpretations. Although this was a remarkable achievement for women, it 
also galvanized communal forces into action that in turn effectively 
discouraged and prevented Muslim women from claiming their right to 
extended maintenance under the secular law. In other words, the method of 
challenging Muslim laws through majority-controlled judicial channels has 
proved of limited use and mostly ineffectual. Thus, the only viable option left 
for Muslim minority women in India was hermeneutics. As exemplified by 
AIMWPLB and BMMA, an increasing number of women’s groups engages in 
feminist and liberal theology and renders emancipatory interpretations of 
Sharia, and by doing so, constantly challenges the scriptural and exegetical 
monopoly of male-dominated institutions and prevailing gender norms in 
society. 
It cannot yet be claimed that there is a full-blown feminist or theological 
revolution taking place in either country. However, there is certainly a steady 
and silent revolution in the making. Hermeneutic communities constantly alter 
the way society understands the legality of Muslim personal status laws that 
dictate women’s role in the familial and public space by deconstructing the 
meaning of texts, historical narratives, and tradition. The pace of reform 
introduced through hermeneutic means may be criticized as too slow. It may 
also fall short of so-called universal and secular standards of women’s rights. 
However, these “limited” and “gradual” changes may be more likely to affect 
 
 102 Interview with Pers. Status Court Judge, in Cairo, Egypt (June 21, 2004). The interviewee declined to 
be identified. 
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women’s rights in the desired direction than top-down secular remedies. This 
does not mean that secular interventions are always doomed to fail. 
Experiences of these two countries, however, suggest that they tend to be 
rather symbolic, limited and indirect, and rarely offer a viable option, 
especially to Muslim women in minority settings. Therefore, hermeneutic 
activity or “reform from within” stands a better chance of acceptance and 
success in the long term. However, the ultimate goal of any reform, whether 
brought about through hermeneutic or secular means, should be to attain social 
change by altering long-existing cultural dispositions and stereotypes about 
women’s role and place in the society. Otherwise, prevailing cultural and 
institutional prejudices against women will undercut reform and prevent it 
from attaining its full potential. 
